MUTUALITY OF OBLIGATION AND REMEDY AS
A REQUISITE TO EQUITABLE RELIEF, WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO OIL AND GAS
LEASES.
The Supreme Court of Illinois has recently decided in
the case of Ulrey v. Keith,1 that a court of equity will not
afford protection to a lessee under a so-called "oil and gas.
lease," where the lessee, by the terms of the instrument, is
given the right to terminate the lease at any time. While
recognizing the lease to be binding on the lessor in a court of
law, they deny the right of the lessee to obtain an injunction
restraining the extraction of oil and gas by one claiming
under a subsequent lease, which is admittedly void. Operations by a trespasser Would, of course, be enjoined on the
ground of waste, but a bill for an injunction agaist the
lessor and his subsequent lessee is said tobe a bill seeking
a virtual specific performance of the' first lease as against
the lessor. This is refused for "lack of mutuality in
remedy."
The defense of lack of mutuality in remedy has long
beena weapon in the hands of astute counsel with which to
perplex the mind of a court sitting in equity. For this
reason the novelty of the question as applied to oil and gas
leases is all the more surprising. Since the year 1859, the
date of the discovery of oil in Western Pennsylvania, to the
present time, when the existence of these valuable minerals
has been found to extend to thirty of the forty-six states of
the Union, a vast amount of litigation has taken place concerning the respective rights of adverse lessees. During this
period of time many leases, similar in form to the lease
'86 N. E. (111.) 696.
(x6)
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involved in Ulrcy v. Keith, have been before the courts.2
Now, apparently for the first time, the question here raised
is presented, and squarely decided.'
In order to apprehend the full force and effect of this
decision, as well as the reasoning of the Illinois court, a
short statement of the facts is necessary: The lease in question was executed for the tern of five years and "as much
longer as oil and gas is found in paying quantities." It
contained the usual provisions of the oil and gas lease with
both a prospective and a present consideration moving from
the lessee. The prospective consideration was a reservation
of a one-eighth royalty of all the oil and a certain rental to
be paid for each producing gas well. The present consideration consisted of the nominal sum of "$i.oo, the receipt
of which is hereby acknowledged," and covenants by the
lessee to drill a well within twelve months or, in default
thereof, to pay a rental at the rate of $1.oo per acre per
year. It also contained the following so-called "surrender
clause":
"It Is agreed that upon the payment of $i.oo at any time * * said
parties of the second part, their successors or assigns, shall have the
right to surrender this lease for cancellation, after which all payments
and liabilities thereafter to accrue under and by virtue of its terms, shall
cease and determine and this lease becomes absolutely null and void."

The lease was duly recorded, a well was drilled by the
lessee in four months, but operations were then discontinued
for a time. A second lease was then executed by the owner
of the premises to other parties, who took possession and
began operations. Whereupon the prior lessee filed his bill
in equity, asking an injunction restraining defendants from
'The following are a few cases granting equitable relief where the
point was not noticed: Compton v. People's Gas. Co., 89 Pac. (Kan.)
803; Pittsburgh, etc., Co. v. Bailey, go Pac. (Kan.) 803; Northwestern
Ohio Gas Co. v. Browning, TS Ohio C. C. Rcp. 84; Friend v. Mallory,
52 W. Va. 53; 43 S. E. 114; Logan Nat. Gas Co. v. Great Southern Oil
& Gas Co., 126 Fed. 623; Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 Fed. 8oi;
Allegheny Oil Co. v. Snyder, xo6 Fed. 764
Warlord Oil & Gas Co. v. ShipNman, 233 I1. o, contains a dictum
that a surrender clause in an oil and gas lease destroys the right to
equitable relief. But the case went off on other grounds.
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drilling for oil or gas. A decree by the lower court granting
the injunction was reversed by the Supreme Court on the
ground that a "suit to enjoin the violation of a contract is
governed by the same rules as a suit to enforce specific
perforrhance." Since the existence of the surrender clause
would prevent an enforcement of the lease against the lessee,
there was held to be a lack of mutuality in remedy which
precluded equitable relief against the lessor. So far from
suggesting that the lease became nudum pactum by reason
of the lessee's option to terminate, this is distinctly denied
and the validity of the contract sustained. The decision,.
therefore, is one relating solely to the remedy available under
a binding contract.
The reason for the existence of this surrender clause,
which is found in most oil and gas leases, is to be found in
the conditions under which such leases are taken. Men who
make a business of taking leases visit undeveloped, or "wildcat" territory, far ahead of operations, and lease'a number
of adjoining farms in a vicinity, so as to make up a "block"

of leases. It is necessary that a large block of leases be
obtained, as otherwise the operator would risk his money in
sinking wells and discovering oil for whomsoever might
obtain the adjacent territory. The expenditure is large, the
chances of finding oil small. Consequently, if the result be

such as to discourage further developments in that vicinity,
it is necessary, for the protection of the operator, that he
have the privilege, upon the payment of a small sum or the
rentals due to date, of surrendering all his leases and shielding himself from further liability. Since the lessee shoulders

all the risk, this provision is surely not unfair,4 and it is only

by reason of the technical rule requiring mutuality in the

remedy that the injunction is refused.
Before considering the various questions involved in
determining the correctness of this decision, it would be of
advantage to examine the nature of the interest acquired by
See Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 Fed. 8ox, and New American
Oil & Mining Co. v. Troyer, 77 N. E. (Ind. i9o6) 739.

MUTUALITY AND EQUITABLE RELIEF

the lessee under an oil and gas lease. If such a lease vested
in the lessee an estate in the oil and gas, there would be an
estate in the land which would of itself be the proper object
of equitable relief. Such a construction would dispense with
any discussion as to mutuality. The requirement of mutuality in remedy applies only to executory contracts, and,
supposing the lease to grant an estate in the land, wrongful
extractioa of the oil and gas would be enjoined, as coming
under the ancient head of equitable jurisdictioncalled Waste.'
But the courts, it an early date, held that oil and gas, owing
to their fleeting and fugitive character, were minerals ferai
naturcr-ike wild animals or running water, they could not
be the subject of absolute ownership until reduced to possession.0 Although not yet established beyond controversy, the
better opinion seems to be that, before oil or gas is found,
the lessee has the vested right to search; after it is found,
the vested right to produce; but no title in the oil itself until
actually in possession.7
In seeking to enforce the lease against a subsequent lessee
in a court of equity, the right of the lessor to forfeit the first
lease is often involved. Here .we find a modification of the
rule that equity abhors a forfeiture. Owing to the peculiar
nature of oil and gas as minerals, and the consequent importance of diligent operations, a clause giving to the lessor
the right to forfeit for failure to drill within a specified time
is not considered odious. 8 But no such right exists unless
'Gillespie v. Fulton Oil & Gas Co., 236 I1. i88; Bellman v. Harness,

42V . Va. 433; 26 S. E. 271.

'State v. Ohio Oil Co., i5o ind. 2, affirmed in 177 U. S. i9o; Funk
v. Haldeinan, 53 Pa. 229; Westmoreland v. Dewitt, z3o Pa. 235; Venture
Oil Co. v. Fretts, 152 Pa. 451; McNish v. Stone, 152 Pa. 457 (note);
ParishFork Oil Co. v. Bridgewater Gas Co., 51 W. Va. 583; 42 S. E.
(W. Va.) 655; Lowther Oil Co. v. Miller-Sibley Co., 53 W. Va. 5oi;
44 S. E. (W. Va.) 433. But see Stoughton's Appeal. 88 Pa. 198; Duke
v. Hague, ig Penna. Weekly Notes Cases, 353; Jennings v. Bloomfield,

i9g Pa. 638; Wilson v. Yovst, 43 W. Va. 826; 28 S. E. (W. Va.) 78!.
'Parish Fork Oil Co. v. Bridgewater Gas Co., s W. Va. 583; 42
S. E. 655.
'Brown v. V, ndergrift, ,o Pa. z42; Monroe v. Armstrong, 96 Pa. 3o7.
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expressly provided for in the lease, 9 and, consequently,
Ulrey v. Keith cannot be justified on the ground that the
lessee had forfeited his rights by inactivity.
Where no operations have been commenced under an oil
and gas lease, the courts, because of the peculiar nature of
the right granted, have come to treat it as no better than an
executory contract. In doing so, however, they have overlooked the fact that, although no property right may exist
in the land, the lessee does possess a vested right to searcha valuable property right which should be protected by
injunction from irreparable injury. If the lessee's right to
produce will be thus protected, 10 it is difficult to see why his
right to search will not be guarded in the same manner.
Protection of a property right was one of the grounds on
which an injunction was granted in Singer Sewing Machine
Co. v. Union Buttonhole Co.,"1 where there had been a grant
of an exclusive patent right. In his opinion Judge Lowell
says:
"But the contract contains in itself, as we have seen, not only
executory agreements on both sides, but a present grant, for value, of
the exclusive right to sell; and my present impression is, that such a
grant is good, and is to be enforced, so long as it lasts, whether the
remainder of the contract is mutual or not, provided the whole contract,
including the grant,'is not so unequal as to be void in a court of equity,
which, as at present advised of the facts, I see no reason to hold."

The validity of such a lease having been established in
Poe v. Ulrey,1 2 and the contract declared to be binding on
the lessor, the court in Ulrey v. Keith deny the obligation
to be one of equitable cognizance. An anomalous condition
of the law is seen to exist. The lessor cannot avoid the
lease by declaring a forfeiture. If, however, the lessee has
*Thompson v. Christie, 138 Pa. 230; Marshall v. Forest Oil Co., 198
Pa. 83; Harness v. Eastern Oil Co., 38 S. E. (W. Va.) 662.
Westmoreland, etc., Gas. Co. v. Detwitt, supra.
=Fed. Cas. z2, 9o4.
" 233 IlL 56. This was a case where the lessor brought a bill in
equity to have a lease declared null and void for want of mutuality of
obligation. It was held that the surrender clause did not invalidate the
lease, and that an estate at the will of one of the paries was not thereby
rendered an estate at the wil of the other.

MUTUALITY AND EQUITABLE RELIEF

not taken possession, the lessor can indirectly accomplish
the same result by executing another lease, and the rightful
lessee is practically helpless. The latter cannot bring ejectment.' 3 Remitted to his action at law for breach -of contract, the lessee is giv.en a remedy hopelessly inadequate. As
1 4 after the legwas said arguendo in Gruinmett v. Gingrass,
islature of that state had changed the law laid down in Rust
5
v. Conrad."
"An action at law for damages would be entirely illusory, and the
result would be that the development of the mineral wealth of the-Upper
Peninsula would be retarded, if the law, as laid down by the Supreme
Court, had not been changed by the legiilature."

Since the amount of oil and gas underneath the land,
less the expeinse incident to its production, is incapable of
measurement, the damages are far from being easily ascertainable. An. irreparable injury is allowed to be inflicted
on the holder of an admitted legal right, while the arm of
equity is stayed by invoking the rule requiring mutuality
of remedy. Such leases are thus rendered practically worthless. Unless possession is immediately taken, they must be
held subject to the whim of every unscrupulous lessor who
desires to make a better bargain by leasing for better terms
than he was at first able to obtain.
The practical result of such a state of the law can hardly
be beneficial. Thousands of leases will be jeopardized in a
state where oil and gas have only recently been discovered.
It is usually the policy of the courts to encourage development of the natural resources of the state wherever possible,
and, taking judicial notice of peculiar conditions surrounding certain industries, they have been known to modify rules
lWatford Oil & Gas Co. v. Shipman, 233 IlL 9; Dark v. Joh"non,
55 Pa. 164; Kelley v. Keys, 213 Pa. 295. The reason is that a lessee for
oil and gas purposes who has not taken possession has not an absolute
right to possession. His interest is only an incorporeal one with a
qualified right to possession for searching for oil and gas. Though
sometimes called an incorporeal hereditament, it is, of course, a chattel.
real, and not strictly a hereditament. Brown v. Beecher 12o Pa. 59o.
"77 Mich.369.

Infro.
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of law and equity accordingly.'$ When this argument was
urged upon the Illinois Court they answered that they were
bound by precedent; but whether or not the cases they considered binding were really in point will be considered later.
A full discussion of the effect of the surrender clause
upon the legal contract is without the scope of this article.
Although the question should be free from doubt, the courts
have been led astray by specious arguments of counsel, and
much confusion has resulted. There has been a failure to
distinguish between cases involving the type of lease shown
above, and another form of lease, wherein the lessee appears
to enter into an obligation, only to be relieved therefrom by
later provisions in the lease."7 In such cases the lease is
'n New American Oil, &c., Co. v. Troyer, 77 N. E. (Ind.) 739, the
Supreme Court of Indiana refused to apply to an oil and gas lease the
ordinary rule of their state that a lease terminable at the will of one of
the parties was terminable at the will of the other also. This departure
they justified on the ground that practical conditions in the oil and gas
world (i. e., the risk and uncertainty involved in searching for fugitive
minerals like oil and gas) demand a surrender clause in favor of lessee.
It might be noted here that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
Sanderson v. PennsylvaniaCoal Co., 113 Pa. 126, went further in breaking away from authority than the Illinois Court was called upon to do.
In that case the development of the coal resources of.Pennsylvania was
favored, and the coal company was allowed to pollute a stream, to the
injury of the lower riparian owner, by pumping into it water from the
mine.

"Such a lease was involved in the much-quoted case of Eclipse Oil
Co. v. South Penn Oil Co., 47 W. Va. 84; 34 S. . 923. Here there was
a lease for three years with covenants to drill within a certain time or
pay rental, followed by a surrender clause providing that lessee should
have the right "at any time to surrender up this lease and be relieved
from all moneys due and conditions unfulfilled." To quote from the
language of the Court, "the covenant to pay is brought to birth by the
lease only to die at the hands of its mother, a case of fmtal strangulation which kills the mother.' The" distinction between this and the
Illinois case is obvious, for in the latter lease the surrender clause
relieved the lessee only from the liabilities thereafter to accrue. But see
Thompson v. Christie, 138 Pa. 230, and Hooks v. Forst, 165 Pa. 238,
where the point was apparently overlooked.
So also where the lease is for a term of years, with a proviso that
the lessor may declare a forfeiture, unless the lessee complete a -well
within a specified time or pay a rental. There being no ubligation
imposed on the lessee, the lease falls for want of consideratinn. Carte'vousA Barnsdal,236 I1. 138; Knight v. IndianaIron Co., 47 Ind. o5;
[departed from in New American Oil & Mining Co. v. T-oyer. ;7 N. .
(Ind.) 739]; Glascow v. Chartiers Trust Co., 152 Pa. 48; (but see suggestion of a promise to be implied on the part of the lessee in Ray v.
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rendered ;nudun pactum, and is, therefore, terminable at any
time nt the will of either party. But in cases where a definite obligation is imposed on the lessee, the great weight
of authority is in favor of supporting the lease in spite of the
lessee's option to terminate.1 s
Where a lease was granted for a specified term of years,
the common law of England at an early day refused to allow
a lessor the correlative right of termination because his
lessee possessed such right."9 So in cases involving oil and
gas leases some of our courts have laid great stress upon
the existence of a definite and permissible term. 20 In other
courts, the leases have been sustained merely upon the one
dollar consideration recited;21 though there seems to be a
difference of opinion whether the one dollar will support a
lease only for a term of years as specified,2 2 or will also support the privilege of extending the lease by the payment of
rental. 23 Another fact which would seem to be of importance is that this surrender clause is ordinarily based upon
the separate and valuable consideration of one dollar to be
paid when the election to surrender is made. Since it is
always open to parties to agree upon terms for a discharge
of the contract, it might be argued with some force that this
surrender clause should be treated as a. separate contract,
Natural Gas Co., 138 Pa. 576); Petroleum Co. v. Coal &. Mfg. Co., 89
Tenn. 381; Steelsinith v. Gartlan,45 W. Va. 27; 29 S. E. 978; Huggins
v. Daley, 99 Fed. 6o6; Federal Oil Co. v. Western Oil Co., 112 Fed. 373,
affirmed in 121 Fed. 674. See also National Oil Co. v. Teel, 67 S. W.
(Tex.) 545; Roberts v. McFaden, 74 S. W. (Tex.) iii.
"Poe v. Ulrey, 233 Ill. 56; New American Oil & Mining Co. v.
Troyer, 77 N. F. (Ind.) 739; Brown v. Fowler, 62 N. E. 76; 65 Ohio,

507; Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 14o Fed. Sox; Thompson v. Christie,

138 Pa. 23o; Hooks v. Forst, 165 Pa. 238. Contra: Jennings-Haywood
Oil Syndicate v. Development Co., 44 So. (La.) 48r.
'Danti v. Spurrier,3 Bos. & PuL 399 (x8o3).
" Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., T40 Fed. Box ; Brown v. Fowler, 6S
Ohio, 5o7; 63 N. E. 76; Cf. Effinger v. Lewis, 32 Pa. 367.
' Poe v. Ulrey, 233 111. 56; Brown v. Ohio Oil Co., 21 Ohio C. C. IT7;
Lowther Oil Co. v. Guffev, 52 W. Va. 88; 43 S. E. jot. Contra: Guffey
Petroleum Co. v. Oinvcr,'79 S. W. (Tex.) &4 (no covenants by lessee).
Brown v. Ohio Oil Co., supra.
Oil Co. v. Snyder, To6 Fed. 764.
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which could not invalidate the instrument any more than if
it had been written upon a different piece of paper at a different time.
The binding nature of the contract having been once established. tle question presents itself whether the obligation is
one of equitable cognizance.
Ever since the rule requiring mutuality of remedy as a
condition precedent to equitable relief 24 was first clearly
enunciated in Flight v. Bolland,2 5 where an infant was
denied specific performance on his contract to convey land,
it has'been repeated with a frequency only equalled by the
number of times it has been misunderstood. In its development this rule has been greatly modified. 26 A sentence from
which was quoted in the early
Fry on Specific Performance,
27
decisions, will illustrate.
"A contract to be specifically enforced by a court must, as a general

rule, be mitual-that is to say, such that it might, at the time it was

entered into,' have been enforced by either of the parties against the
other of them."

Though a few courts appear to have followed this statement of the law, 29 it has finally become well established that
lack of mutuality at the time the contract was entered into
will be entirely disregarded, provided the remedies are mutual at the time the contract comes before the court 3s In
other words, mutuality may be supplied, by performance of
the non-enforceable acts. But, even taking the rule in its
'Whether

the existence of the right to specific performance to a

contract, should give the other party the same right, is an altogether
different question. For an excellent review of the law on this point, see
an opinion by Smith, J., in Eckstein v. Downing, 64 N. H. 24&
M4 Russ. W (828).
"Lamprey v. St. Paul, &c., Railway Co., 89 Min
"Third Ed., page 215.
"The italics are ours.

187.

"Hope v. Hope, 8 De G. M. & G. 731; Luse v. Deitz, 46 Ia. 2o5;
N. J. Eq. 47 (dictum); Shenandoah Val. R. R.

Ten Eyck v. Manning, 52

Co. v. Dunlop, 86 Va. 346; Norrisv. Fox, 45 Fed. 406.
" Wilks v. Georgia Pac. R. R. Co., /9 Ala. z8o; French v. Boston
-Nat. Bank, it7g Mass. 4o4; Welch v. Whelplev. 62 Mich. T5; Howe v.
llation, 6o N. F- (Mass.) 314; Woodruff v. W~oodruff, 44 N. J. Eq. 349.
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modified form, it is overloaded with so many exceptions 31
that one is surprised at the unqualified finality with which it
is often laid down. Confusion reigns among the decisions.
The text-book writers have done little to clarify the law
because of their parrot-like utterances and failure to grasp
the true principle involved.32
The confusion of thought on the subject is directly triaceable to the different senses in which the word "mutuality"
is used. When a court speaks of "mutuality" without further limiting the word, it may mean one of two things:
nutuality of obligation, or mutuality of remedy. "Want of
mutuality of obligation" is ordinarily used to denote an
absence of quid pro quo-thit there is an agreement, but
no binding contract. It may mean, however, that there is
a binding contract by the very terms of which one party
cannot compel the other to perform (an option is an example
of want of mutuality of obligation in this sense of the
phrase). "Want of mutuality of remedy" properly means
that there is a binding contract, but, from the nature of the
consideration moving from plaintiff to defendant, the defendant cannot compel specific performance of his part of
the contract. The most ordinary example. of such a case is
a contract for the conveyance of land in return for personal
services to be performed. 3 Here there is an infirmity in the
equitable machinery, which cannot compel the rendition of
services, but not in the contract itself. The granting of
such a decree would give one party an unfair advantage
over the other by requiring one to execute his side of the
contract in full, and leave him to his remedy at law for
'For a list of obvious exceptions to the rule requiring mutuality in

remedy before specific performance will be decreed, see article by Prof.
Ames, 3 Columbia Law Rc'iew, x. Absolute identity of remedy is, of

course, unnecessary. Grove v. Hodges, 55 Pa. 5a4.
"The subject has been ably treated in two enlightening articles of
comparatively recent date; one. by Prof. Lewis, of the University of
Pennsylvania, in a series of articles in 49 American Law Register, pp.
22o, 317, 383, 447, 5o7 and 559; the other, by Prof. Ames, in 3 Columbia
La. Review, p. j.
"Chad ick v. Chadwmik, 121 Ala.

o.
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enforcing the obligation running to him. Viewed in this
light, the purpose of the rule requiring mutuality of remedy
is simply that ofie party to a contract shall not be required
to perform, unless performance by the other party is given
or assured. 3 ' Such a rule is neither "artificial" nor "difficult
to understand and remember."3
Does the option to terminate the lease by a surrender
thereof preclude equitable relief? The question appears to
haVe been first raised in Rust v. Conrad,36 a Michigan case,
which, like the one before the Illinois Court, concerned the
development of the state's mineral resources. This was a
bill for specific performance of a contract to execute a lease
to plaintiff for mining purposes, in consideration of plaintiff's exploring the property for iron ore. The defendant
was allowed to set up, as a defense to the suit, the fact that
the lease agreed upon gave the lessee the privilege of terminating it upon thirty days' notice. The Court based their
decision on the ground that equity should never interfere
where the power of revocation exists, at the same time observing that there was nothing of hardship, inequality or
unfairness in the contract. Two distinct principles of equity
appear to have been confused: one, that a court will not do
a vain or useless thing; the other, that there must be mutuality in remedy. In all but one of the cases relied on by the
Court it was the defendant who possessed the power of revocation-a situation vastly different from the principal case,
where the option to terminate was in the plaintiff. That he
might subsequently see fit to renounce the contract would
seem to be a contingency that might "safely be left to take
" This was clearly stated as early as 1849 in Waring v. Manchester
Co., 7 Hare, 482, where Vice-Chancellor Wigram said, p. 492:
"The court does not give relief to the plaintiff, although he be otherwise entitled to it, uhless he t/ill on his part do all that the defendant
may be entitled to ask from him; and if that which the defendant is
entitled to be something which the court cannot give him, it certainly
has been the generally understood rule that that is a case in which the
court will not interfere."'See such criticism of the rule by Prof. Langdell. in j larvard Law
Review, IO4.
**47 Mich. 449 (1882).
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care of itself.""
Pressing for his rights under the contract,
he disavows any intention to exercise his right to terminate
the same. 38 Marble Co. v. Ripley," alone among the cases
cited by the Michigan Court seems to sustain their decision.
This case, decided by the United States Supreme Court in
1869, has befuddled the minds of many courts in applying
the rule requiring mutuality of remedy. Though rightly
decided on its facts, it contains a broad; sweeping dictum
that, "when a contract is incapable of being enforced against
one party, that party is equally incapable of enforcing it
specifically against the other." On this point the case has
been discredited, 40 and is in'direct conflict with two later
cases in the same court.41
Ulrey v. Keith follows Rust v.Conrad, but the.Illinois
Court rest their decision squarely on the ground of lack of
mutuality in remedy, and are not bothered with the chimera
of a decree that might be rendered nugatory by the very
party seeking to obtain it. Without considering the real
purpose of the rule requiring mutuality of remedy, the Illinois Court blindly follows the language applied by other
courts to-very different sets of facts. It is clearly a confusion of ideas to say that an option to terminate a contract
creates a lack of mutuality in remedy. Any such lack exists
by agreement of the parties, and, therefore, goes to the obligation of the contract. The rule requiring mutuality of
remedy is properly applied only to cases where one party
= Prof. Ames's article in 3 Columbia LawReview, p. z.
'The plaintiff might escape the question raised by the surrender
clause by waiving his rights thereunder.
1o Wall. 339; i9 L. Ed. 955Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Buttonhole Co., Fed. Cas. 12,904,
where Lowell, J.,
says:
"I cannot think that the court intended to announce any general
propo.ition that they would never enforce a contract which one party
had a right to put an end to within a year. Everything must depend
upon the nature and circumstances of the husiness. In many of the
cases that I have cited, the plaintiff had it in his power to end the
contract."
"Joy v. City of St. Louis, 738 U. S. 1; 34 .,Ed. 843; Franklin
Tclegraph Co. v. Harrison,145 U. S. 459; 36 L Ed. 776.
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cannot compel performance of that to which the contract
entitles him,--cases where the arm of equity will be unable
to, make the plaintiff perform because of the nature of the
act he has contracted to do.42 Potter, J., writing the opinion
of the Court in PhiladelphiaBall Club v. Lajoje, repudiates
the reasoning of Rust v. Conrad,and with convincing clear43
ness says :
"But mere difference in the rights stipulated for does not destroy

mutuality of remedy. * * * In a fair and reasonable contract it ought

to be sufficient that each party has the possibility of compelling the
performance of the promises which were mutually agreed upon."

In refusing to recognize lack of mutuality in remedy as a,
defefise to a bill for specific performance, where this lack of
mutuality springs from the terms of the contract, some courts
have relied on cases enforcing options to purchase land or
options of renewal contained in a lease. 4 4 An option is, of
course, valueless unless it can be specifically enforced, and it
is now well settled that, if founded on valuable consideration,
specific performance will be granted in spite of the fact that,
when the option is given, one party is bound and the other
not. 45 Such cases, however, are not really in point; for
upon filing a bill to enforce the option, a bilateral- contract
arises. An option, given under seal and for a valuable consideration, is an irrevocable offer, and the act of filing the
bill constitutes an acceptance of that offer.4 8 It thereupon
'
For a clear exposition of these principles as applied to contracts
involving options to terminate, see Dr. Lewis's Third Paper in 49
American Law Register, 447, at pages 460 and 461.
The distinction between lack of mutuality in remedy and lack of
mutuality in obligation is elaborately treated from an historical standpoint by Dr. Lewis in his First and Second Papers, 49 American.Law
Register, page 22o, and id., page 383. -The development of.the English
Law, as traced in these articles, is most instructive, showing how the
English Courts have gradually come to confine themselves to lack of
mutuality in remedy as a defense to a suit for specific 1:erformance, and
disregard, entirely, the defense of lack of mutuality in obligation, so
long as it does not amount to undum pactum.

42o2

Pa.

21, 219.

" Green v. Richards, 23 N. J. Eq. 32; Vat Doren v. Robintson, 16 N. J.

Eq.

259.

See Am. & Eng. Ene. of Law, Vol. 21, p. 928.
"'For two recent cases treating an option as a continuing offer and
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becomes, mutual both in obligation and remedy.

Conse-

quently, such cases are not authority for the proposition that
specific performance will be granted where the mutuality
in remedy is lacking by reason of the agreement between the
parties. A true test of this proposition would be one where
an option was granted for the purchase of land at a certain
price, acceptance to be made within a specified period, and a
substantial sum paid as hand money. Before the expiration
of the time set, the optionor prepares to sell the land to a third
party, and the optionee, without signifying his intention to
accept the option, brings a bill for an injunction to restrain
the threatened transfer of the land. Although no such case
has been discovered, there would seem to be no good reason
why the optionor should not be enjoined from a breach
of his expressed or implied obligation not to sell to a third
party. If the option agreement could not be immediately
recorded, the injury to the optionee would be irreparable,
and an injunction should lie to protect the exclusive privilege which had been granted.
Although Rust v. Conradand Ulrey v. Keith were wrongly
decided, there is a distinction between the two cases which
should not be overlooked. In the former case, the plaintiff
was' asking the court to compel defendant to perform an
executory contract, while in the latter case, the plaintiff was
asking the court to enjoin certain acts, which would amount
to a breach of the contract. It is the distinction between
affirmative and negative relief. While it is true that a bill
for an injunction, restraining defendant from a breach of
his contract, is virtually a bill seeking the specific performance of the contract, does it follow that affirmative and negative relief must always be governed by the same rules and
doctrines?
The loose statement often found in cases and text-books,
to the effect that injulnctions and decrees are granted accorddealing with the nature and cnforceability of the optionee's right, see
B.aries v. Rca, 219 Pa. 279. and Barnes v. )?ea, id. 287. See also Wald's
Pollock on Contracts (Williston's Ed.), p. 28.
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ing to the same rules, should be qualified with many exceptions. It is true that the same general principles of equity
apply to both forms of relief: the plaintiff must have clean
hands ;47 the contract must be supported by something more
than nominal consideration; 48 the terms of the contract
must be certain. 4 9 But if, by reason of the circumstances
of the cases, or the power of equity to mould its decree,
the reasons for refusing specific performance do not apply to
the writ of injunction, the hand of the Chancellor should not
be arbitrarily withheld.
Although the early English cases held otherwise, it was
finally decided in the leading case of Lumley v. Wagner,"'
that the negative part of a contract would be enforced by
injunction, where actual performance of the contract could
not be decreed. This doctrine is now well established in
most of our states. 5 1 In that case the defendant had agreed
to sing in plaintiff's theatre for a certain number of nights
and not to sing elsewhere. It was held that equity would
enjoin defendant from singing elsewhere, although the court
could not compel actual performance of defendant's personal services.52 This class of cases, though having nothing
to do with mutuality of remedy, does, nevertheless, serve to
show an important distinction between affirmative and negative relief inequity. From them we see that these two forms
of relief are not governed by the same rules, if the same
reasons for withholding the one do not apply to withholding the other.
Returning, now, to cases involving contracts containing
options to terminate, we find that in suits to restrain the
breach of such contracts, equity has the power to supply any
lack of mutuality by moulding its decree. The injunction
"Gas Light Co. v. Town of Lake, 130 I1. 42.
'Railway Co. v. City of East St. Louis, T82 111. 433.
' Cleveland v. Martin, 218 Ill. 73.
"i De G. M. & G. 6o4.
'See .2 Cyc. Law & Procedure,p. 45. and cases cited.
" This case contains annther point which we consider below.
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restraining defendant from a breach can be made conditional
upon continued performance on the part of the plaintiff. Injunctive relief in the proper form can thus obviate the objection which might apply to a decree compelling specific
performance. The injunction sought by the plaintiff will
remain in force only so long as he himself performs his
duties, and thus the defendant becomes the beneficiary under
the decree. 3s On the other hand, in a bill for specific performance of a contract to onvey land for personal services,
the present deed of the land cannot, in the nature of things,
be conditioned upon the performance of gervices which continue into the future.
In the class of cases involving a contract to play baseball
for a club, which is given the right to terminate the contract
upon short notice, the salutary force of a conditional decree
was for a long time overlooked. The courts held that the
contract to play ball would not be negatively enforced in
favor of the club by enjoining the player from signing with
any other club, since there was a lack of mutuality of remedy.54 But in PhiladelphiaBall Club v. Lajoie,5 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued an injunction restraining a breach of the contract, basing their decision both on
the ground that a difference in the rights stipulated for does
not create a lack of mutuality of remedy, 6 and also on the
ground that the injunction could be made conditional in
form. On this latter point the court say.57
"Besides the remedy by injunction is elastic and adaptable and is
wholly within the control of the court. If granted now it can be easily
dissolved whenever a change in the circumstances or in the attitude of
the plaintiff should seem to require it."
See Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence,Vol. 6, Sec. 775
"Philadelphia Ball Club v. Halman, 8 Pa. Co. Ct. 58 (decided partly
on the ground that contract was unfair) ; HarrisburgBase-Ball Club v.
Athletic Association, 8 Pa. Co. Ct. 337; Brooklyn Base-Ball Club v. McGuire, 1x6 Fed. 782- See also Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ward, 9
N. Y. Sup. 779 (contract held to lack definiteness as well as mutuality);
Metropalitan Exhibition Co. v. Ewing, 42 Fed. i98; 7 L R. A. 381.
n2o2 Pa. 210.
"Supra.
0 P. 221.
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Turning from terminable contracts to cases involving a
real lack of mutuality in remedy, we find that a conditional
decree-may cure the inequality, provided negative relief is
sought. In Lminlcy v. Wagner,58 the defendant had an adequate remedy at law, and could not have compelled his employment by either an affirmative or negative decree. The
remedy in* that case, therefore, was not mutual. But, if
the plaintiff had been given a decree, restraining defendant
from singing elsewhere, to remain in force only so long as
plaintiff himself performed, defendant would have been practically assured of performance on the part of the plaintiff.
This point was raised in the case of GeneralElectric Company v. Westinghouse Electric Conipany " ' recently decided
in the-United States Circuit Court for the Northern District
of New York. A bill was filed for an injunction restiaining the further violation by defendant of a contract for the
sale of electric equipment. By the contract in question, plaintiff company agreed to sell and deliver controllers at specified prices to defendant company, although not exclusively
to it. The defendant, on its part, agreed not to manufacture
such controllers for use in the United States, and it was held
that equity would enjoin defendant from a breach of this
agreement; Recognizing the fact that defendant could not
have affirmative or negative relief in equity for compelling
plaintiff to furnish the controllers, the Court nevertheless
granted negative relief in the shape of a conditional decree,
and, in an elaborate opinion, say :6
"There is a class of cases where defendant may be enjoined from
violating the negative part of an agreement when neither the plaintiff
nor defendant can have specific performance of the affirmative side or
part of the same agreement. The answer of equity in such cases to the
want of mutuality in remedy is a conditional decree for performance.
or enjoining a violation of the covenant-one good so long as plaintiff
performs, and self-dissolving upon his failure to perform."

Suprm.
Fed. 664. This was a re-argument of the same case reported
in 144 Fed. 458. where an injunction was refused partly on the ground
tK:, the reniedy at law for damages was adequate, and partly on the
rround of lack of mutuality in remedy.
"151

" P.672.
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The distinction between affirmative and -negative relief
and the possibility of granting one, though there might not
be power to grant the other, is being recognized with greater
frequency as the courts see the injustice and absurdity of
subjecting both forms of relief to a hard and fast rule, the
meaning of which has been generally misunderstood. The
question whether the existence of a surrender clause in an
oil and gas lease destroys the mutuality of remedy so as to
prevent equitable relief, is one of no small importance in
many states. -The lessee, being without adequate remedy at.
law, pressing for his rights under the contract, hardship and
injustice will be worked if an injunction cannot be issued to
restrain the operations of an adverse lessee. In view of the
fact that there is no real lack of mutuality in remedy, that
a conditional decree will operate with perfect fairness to
all parties, no good reason for refusing the relief prayed
for can be found. The Supreme Court of the state where
the question has first been presented has, it is submitted,
decided the case wrongly, under a misapprehension both of
the true purpose of the rule, and the applicability of the
precedents by which they considered themselves bound.
H. C. McClintock.
Pittsburgh, Pa..

